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ABSTRACT 
Genetically engineered (GE) animals designed for human use, whether to be eaten as 
food, to produce drugs, or to be enjoyed as pets, carry the potential for enormous benefits and 
enormous harm. Currently, the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) 2009 Final Guidance on 
GE animals demonstrates that agency believes it may regulate all GE animals regardless of their 
use under its authority to regulate new animal drugs (NADs), but that it will selectively use its 
enforcement discretion over only some categories of those animals (primarily those intended for 
food or to producer drugs). It has also taken the position that the GE nature of an animal for food 
in itself does not necessitate labeling of the food product, the same position it took for GE crops.  
In the last few years, it has declined to regulate a GE fish intended for use as a pet, has approved 
a new animal drug application (NADA) for a GE goat intended to produce a human drug, and is 
currently considering approval of a GE fish intended to be marketed as food. An examination of 
these examples demonstrates that the 2009 Guidance is flawed in its approach and underlying 
assumptions, and that the use of the NAD scheme to regulate this fundamentally new type of 
animal is inappropriate. FDA’s approach thus far results in insufficient and opaque inquiries into 
the safety of the GE animal to humans, the animal, and the environment, and vests too much 
power in the agency’s discretion, rendering its decisions effectively judicially unreviewable. The 
best solution to this problem would be for Congress to institute a comprehensive statutory and 
regulatory scheme to govern GE animals, giving FDA authorization to regulate GE animals in a 
way more tailored to the unique issues they present, vesting in the Environmental Protection 
Agency authorization to conduct the relevant environmental inquiries, and mandating the 
labeling of food from GE animals. Such an approach would be more in line with the underlying 
science of GE, and would restore public trust in FDA’s assurances of the safety of their food and 
drugs. 
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  If the salmon you were about to buy for dinner tonight were engineered with a gene from 
another fish cut and pasted into it, but was cheaper than other salmon, would you still buy it? 
What if the salmon you ate for dinner last night was genetically engineered that way, and you 
never knew it? The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is currently reviewing an application 
for the marketing of AquAdvantage Salmon – which has been genetically engineered (GE) to 
grow to full size twice as fast as normal salmon – and would be the first GE animal approved for 
human consumption. FDA does not currently intend to require the fish to be labeled as GE to the 
consumer. In recent years, there has been a revolution in the genetic engineering of animals for 
human benefit, and FDA has scrambled to devise a scheme with which to regulate them. Its 
response was to utilize an old but familiar regulatory framework designed for an entirely 
different purpose. This has resulted in an incoherent policy that is out of tune with the realities of 
the unique risks GE animal products pose to humans, animals, and the environment, and with 
consumers’ overwhelming interest in knowing what exactly they are eating.  
Part I of this paper will provide a background on the science of genetic engineering of 
organisms. Part II will describe the current regulatory framework through which FDA and other 
agencies regulate GE organisms, focusing on animals and those used as food. Part III will 
examine three recent examples of FDA’s regulation of GE animals to shed light on how the 
regulatory scheme works in practice. Part IV will present conclusions on the extent to which the 
recent cases demonstrate problems with the current regulatory scheme, and suggest possible 
remedies to improve and streamline regulatory oversight of GE animals.   
I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOOD 
A. Scientific Background 
Humans have conducted genetic modification of animals and plants, in a formal sense,  3 
since organisms with desirable traits were first bred together – crossbreeding of different species  
of animals dates back to the mule.
1 Since the 1970s, however, humans have also gained the 
ability to genetically engineer an organism by inserting of a gene from one organism into the 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of another of the same or different species, what is referred to as 
recombinant DNA (rDNA).
2  In the rDNA technique, first, a desirable trait from a donor animal 
is determined. Then, the gene which codes for that trait is identified, isolated, and copied. That 
isolated gene (now a “transgene”) is “pasted” into the DNA of an animal cell at or around its 
embryo stage.
3 As the animal develops, it will express the new trait (now a “transgenic” animal), 
and transgenic animals can then be bred with one another in traditional ways to create a line of 
animals expressing the transgene. Because DNA and its translation into proteins is common to 
all living things, a gene from any organism is able to be transferred to any other; i.e., an animal 
could be engineered to express a trait from another animal, a plant, a bacterium, etc.  
With similar techniques, scientists have genetically engineered plants for human 
consumption. The first commercial GE food was the Flavr Savr tomato, introduced in 1994, 
which was modified to ripen more slowly on the vine.
4 Since then, over 60 GE plants have been 
                                                        
1 RACHEL BORGATTI & EUGENE H. BUCK, U.S. CONG. RES. SERV., RS21996, GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FISH AND 
SEAFOOD 1 (Dec. 2004).  
2 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-566, GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS: EXPERTS VIEW REGIMEN OF 
SAFETY TESTS AS ADEQUATE, BUT FDA’S EVALUATION PROCESS COULD BE ENHANCED 4 (May 2002) [hereinafter 
GAO 02-566]. Such organisms are commonly alternatively referred to as “genetically engineered” and “genetically 
modified.” Although in this article I am formally referring to only genetic modification through heritable rDNA 
constructs, for the sake of consistency and convenience, I will use the term “genetically engineered”/ “GE” to 
describe products of that process. 
3 U. N. FOOD AND AGRI. ORG., CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMM’N, GUIDELINE FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOOD SAFETY 
ASSESSMENT OF FOODS DERIVED FROM RECOMBINANT-DNA PLANTS, CAC/GL 45-2003 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.codexalimentarius.net/download/standards/10021/CXG_045e.pdf [hereinafter CODEX ALIMENTARIUS]. 
There are in actuality a variety of mechanisms by which the new DNA material is inserted into the host animal’s 
DNA, such as microinjection, use of bacterial or viral vectors, etc. Also, insertion can occur around the gamete stage 
or around the embryonic stage. 
4 Gregory N. Mandel, Gaps, Inexperience, Inconsistencies, and Overlaps: Crisis in the Regulation of Genetically 
Modified Plants and Animals, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2167, 2176 (Apr. 2004). 4 
developed and sold as food.
5 Most of these modifications were to agricultural properties of the 
plant, such as increased resistance to pesticides or insect attacks, but some have been engineered 
for nutritional purposes, such as modified oil in a soybean.
6 
B. Risks and Benefits of GE Foods 
Following from the infinite number of ways in which living things can be genetically 
recombined, GE foods have enormous potential for human benefits.  One obvious benefit is 
increased food production, whether by making an organism less vulnerable to outside threats 
from viruses, drought, or weeds, or by creating an animal which reaches full growth earlier, 
saving costs in rearing it.
7 Genetic engineering can also be used to promote human health by 
increasing the quality and nutrition of food in any variety of ways; this type of engineering has 
been touted the “next generation” of GE foods.
8 Also, of great importance to FDA, organisms 
can be engineered to produce proteins or hormones humans can use as drugs, where the organism 
can produce a certain chemical more efficiently than a synthetic process. GE foods also can carry 
environmental benefits: e.g., plants that are engineered to produce their own pesticides reduce 
the need for spraying,
9 and pigs that have been engineered to produce less phosphate in their 
manure.
10 These are just a few examples of the enormous benefits genetic engineering could 
have to increase and improve the world’s supply of food. 
  Despite its benefits, genetic engineering is not without its risks. Scientists are still 
beginning to understand the complexity with which genes interact with one another. “Unintended 
effects can result from the random insertion of DNA sequences into the animal genome, which 
                                                        
5 GAO 02-566, supra note 2, at 9. 
6 Id.   
7 Id. at 8. 
8 Mandel, supra note 4, at 2179. 
9 Id. at 2185. 
10 S.P. Goloban et al., Pigs expressing salivary phytase produce low-phosphorous manure. 19 NATURE BIOTECH. 
741-45 (2001).  5 
may cause disruption or silencing of existing genes, activation of silent genes, or modifications 
in the expression of existing genes. Unintended effects may also result in the formation of new or 
changed patterns of metabolites.”
11 These unintended effects can create three main different 
types of risks: risks to the safety of the food derived from the GE for human consumption, to the 
environment, and to the animal itself. 
  The main human health risks include increased toxicity, allergenicity, and horizontal 
gene transfers.
12 In the first two examples, the GE organism has altered properties itself that 
render it more toxic or allergenic to humans. With horizontal gene transfers, the gene travels 
from the GE animal to another organism, most commonly bacteria. Thus, GE organisms used as 
food carry the particular risk of having their properties transferred to the bacteria that live in the 
human digestive tract, in ways harmful to human health.
13 
  GE organisms also carry environmental risks. In crops, gene transfer can occur by GE 
plants cross-pollinating other plants, converting non-traditional weeds into weeds, or horizontally 
through bacteria or viruses.
14 GE animals carry the risk of physical escape into the environment, 
harming wild animals by increased competition or predation and upsetting the ecosystem.
15 
Some studies have forwarded a “Trojan gene hypothesis”, whereby a GE fish was found to 
outcompete non-altered fish for mates, but rendered less fit offspring, eventually resulting in the 
demise of the wild population.
16 
  Finally, genetic engineering can prove harmful to the animal itself, with negative 
consequences to animal anatomy, such as physical deformity, and to behavior, such as reduced 
                                                        
11 CODEX ALIMENTARIUS, supra note 3, at 2. 
12 Le Curieux-Belfond et al., Factors to consider before production and commercialization of aquatic genetically 
modified organisms: the case of transgenic salmon, 12 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & POL’Y 174-75. 
13 Id. at 175. 
14 NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF TRANSGENIC PLANTS: THE SCOPE AND ADEQUACY OF 
REGULATION 66-67 (2002). 
15 Borgatti & Buck, supra note 1, at 4.  
16 Id.  6 
reproductive behavior.
17 This raises additional ethical concerns, as well as concerns for the safety 
of the food derived from the animal.  
II. FDA REGULATION OF FOOD FROM GE PLANTS 
  Despite these risks, FDA (and the federal government in general) has generally taken a 
stance that GE organisms used for food have substantial equivalence to their original 
counterparts, and thus they carry no unique risks. This view was first expressed implicitly in the 
1986 Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology promulgated by the White House 
Office of Science and Technology Policy, which articulated that GE products would be regulated 
by FDA, EPA, and USDA under already-existing statutes and regulations.
18 “The foundation for 
this decision was a determination that the process of biotechnology was not inherently risky, and 
therefore, that only the products of biotechnology, not the process itself, required oversight.”
19 
A. Applicable Statutory Framework 
  Following suit, FDA was thus faced with the choice to regulate food from GE plants 
either under the adulteration clause of the Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act (FDCA) §402, which 
governs food that  “bears or contains any deleterious substance which may render it injurious to 
health”,
20 or under the food additives clause §409, which governs substances intended for use in 
food, that may reasonably be expected to become a component in food, or that otherwise may 
affect the characteristics of food.
21 The two provisions differ primarily in the degree of FDA 
approval required before the food can be sold. Under §409, the producer of a food additive must 
                                                        
17 Mendal, supra note 4, at 2202.  
18 Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302, 23,302-3 (June 26, 1986). “The 
manufacture by the newer technologies of food, the development of new drugs, medical devices, biologics for 
humans and animals, and pesticides, will be reviewed by FDA, USDA and EPA in essentially the same manner for 
safety and efficacy as products obtained by other techniques. The new products that will be brought to market will 
generally fit within these agencies' review and approval regimens.” Id. at 23,302. 
19 Mendal, supra note 4, at 2216. 
20 21 U.S.C.A. §402(a)(1) (2010). 
21 21 U.S.C.A. §409 (2010). 7 
file with FDA a “food additive petition” before marketing, which requires that the producer 
perform extensive safety testing to demonstrate there is no “reasonable certainty of harm” from 
the additive.
22 If FDA is satisfied of this, it then issues a letter stating that the food additive has 
been approved. The exception for this rigid premarket approval process for food additives is if 
the additive is generally regarded as safe (GRAS) – the GRAS determination was intended to 
cover traditional spices and vinegar, e.g.
23 In contrast, the §401 adulteration clause requires no 
premarket approval and “generally relies upon good manufacturing practices and post-marketing 
detection and recall authority to protect public health.”
24  
  With regard to the labeling of all food ingredients, a food is “misbranded” if it is “false or 
misleading in a material respect”,
25 or “fails to reveal facts material in light of such 
representations or material with respect to consequences which may result from the use of the 
article.”
26 Moreover, food additives must be listed on the ingredients section of the food label.
27 
B. Splitting the Difference: the 1992 Policy on GE Plants 
In its 1992 Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties (“1992 Policy”) 
FDA charted the middle ground: it determined to primarily regulate GE foods under the §401 
adulteration clause, but in an “amplified” way.
28 It determined that GE foods would be ordinarily 
considered GRAS because “[i]n most cases, the substances expected to become components of 
food as a result of genetic modification of a plant will be the same as or substantially similar to 
                                                        
22 Id. 
23 David L. Pelletier, Science, Law, and Politics in the Food and Drug Administration’s Genetically Engineered 
Foods Policy: FDA’s 1992 Policy Statement, 63 NUTRITION REVS. 171, 173 (May 2005). 
24 Id. at 173.  
25 21 U.S.C.A. §343(a) (2010). 
26 21 U.S.C.A. §321(n) (2009). 
27 Pelletier, supra note 23, at 173. 
28 Id.; Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,94-85 [hereinafter 1992 
Policy]. 8 
substances commonly found in food, such as proteins, fats and oils, and carbohydrates.”
29 
Following this was the related proposition that the presence of the rDNA was not itself a food 
additive, but rather that proteins coded and produced by the rDNA would be food additives, if 
they altered the nutritional profile of the food.
30 Importantly, the manufacturer and not FDA 
makes this GRAS determination.
31 
This policy was founded on one major assumption: that “rDNA techniques are simply an 
extension of genetic modification that has been used by humans for thousands of years, that it 
creates no fundamentally new risks, and that it is more precise and predictable than traditional 
plant breeding.”
32 Additionally, its determination not to conduct stringent pre-market review of 
the safety of GE foods stemmed from the scientific difficulty of proving any unintended 
consequences of GE crops.
33 
 Instead, the 1992 Policy described a voluntary process by which a producer would 
follow a set of decision trees provided by FDA to guide it in its GRAS determination, would 
consult with FDA throughout the process, and if successful, receive a letter from FDA that 
reiterated the conclusions the developer had drawn and stated “FDA has no further questions.”
34 
Although the pre-market cooperation with FDA was made voluntary, according to FDA, 
producers have nonetheless sought such consultation before marketing every new variety of GE 
food to date.
35 Finally, FDA determined that GE foods did not have to be labeled as such, as the 
                                                        
29 Id. 
30 See id. at 22,900. “Nucleic acids are present in the cells of every living organism, including every plant and 
animal used for food by humans or animals, and do not raise a safety concern as a component of food.” In contrast, 
“the intended expression product in a food could be a protein, carbohydrate, fat or oil, or other substance that differs 
significantly in structure, function, or composition from substances found currently in food. Such substances may 
not be GRAS and may require regulation as a food additive.” Id. 
31 Id. at 22,989. 
32 Pelletier, supra note 23, at 176. 
33 Id. at 173. 
34 Id. at 173-74. 
35 Id. at 175. 9 
use of rDNA was not a “material fact”, but would require labeling only if the food differed from 
its counterpart in its nutritional profile.
36 
The 1992 Policy also addressed FDA’s potential obligations under the National 
Environmental Protection Act (NEPA). Under NEPA, “[f]or major federal actions, agencies must 
either prepare an EIS [Environmental Impact Statement] examining the environmental impact of 
the proposed action, prepare an EA [Environmental Assessment] determining whether or not to 
prepare an EIS, or claim that the action falls within a Categorical Exclusion.
37 The 1992 Policy 
noted that while food additive permits would constitute major action for NEPA purposes, FDA 
did not consider any actions “other than the promulgation of food additive regulations . . . [to] 
constitute agency action under NEPA”.
38 Because FDA chose primarily not to regulate GE foods 
as a food additive, it thus effectively exempted almost all GE plant foods from NEPA review. 
C. Challenge to the 1992 Policy: Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala 
  While opponents to the 1992 Policy challenged it in federal courts, judges stood behind 
FDA’s determinations. In Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala,
39 plaintiffs representing 
concerned scientists and others launched four main attacks on the guidance: (1) it was invalid 
because it had not been subjected to notice and comment proceedings under the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §553, (2) FDA did not comply with NEPA by completing EA or 
an EIS in the issuance of the policy, (3) FDA’s presumption that rDNA foods are GRAS and 
therefore do not require food additive petitions under §321 was arbitrary and capricious, and (4) 
FDA’s decision not to require labeling for rDNA-developed foods was arbitrary and capricious 
                                                        
36 1992 Policy, supra note 28, at 22,991. 
37 Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 174 (D.D.C. 2000); see 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. 
38 1992 Policy, supra note 28, at 23,004.  
39 116 F. Supp. 2d 166. 10 
because it did not consider widespread consumer interest in the labeling of GE foods.
40 
  The court dismissed the claims and found for FDA, first holding that (1) the guidance 
was a “statement of policy” and thus did not require formal notice and comment proceedings 
under the APA because it was not intended to be binding upon the industry or FDA. It found that 
the guidance only created a presumption that rDNA foods were GRAS, which left the agency 
freedom to exercise discretion if it wished to make an individual determination that a particular 
rDNA food was not GRAS.
41 It also held that (2) FDA did not violate NEPA by failing to 
conduct an EA or EIS because the guidance was not a “major federal action” in the meaning of 
NEPA,
42 because it was reversible, maintained the substantive status quo for regulation of rDNA 
foods, and took no overt action.
43 The court granted Chevron deference to FDA’s interpretation 
of FDCA §321 that rendered rDNA foods presumptively GRAS to find (3) that the agency’s 
determination was not arbitrary and capricious.
44 Finally, it also granted Chevron deference to 
the agency’s interpretation of “material” difference under §321(n) – that the use of rDNA itself 
did not constitute a material difference and that consumer demand alone did not impose a 
labeling requirement – to conclude that FDA’s decision not to require the labeling of rDNA 
foods was not arbitrary and capricious.
45 Thus, the case allowed FDA wide discretion to regulate 
food from GE plants as it wished, shielded by the double protections of “statement of policy” 
and Chevron deference.
46 
 
                                                        
40 Id. at 170. Plaintiffs also challenged that the Guidance (5) violated the Free Exercise Clause and (6) violated the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, id., but those challenges are beyond the scope of this paper. 
41 Id. at 172-73.  
42 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c)(i) (2010). 
43 Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d. at 175. 
44 Id. at 176-77. 
45 Id. at 178. 
46 An FDA decision not to require labeling was also upheld in Stauber v. Shalala, 895 F. Supp. 1178 (W.D. Wis. 
1995), in which the agency’s determination not to require labeling milk from recombinant bovine somatotrophin 
(rbST)-treated cows was granted Chevron deference and found not to be arbitrary and capricious. 11 
III. FDA REGULATION OF GE ANIMALS  
  On the heels of genetically engineering plants for commercial use came the genetic 
engineering of animals. The first GE animals were mice produced in the early 1980s.
47 GE 
animals are currently being developed for a variety of direct human uses: to be consumed as 
human food, to produce drugs used by humans, and as human pets.  Additionally, they are used 
in research laboratories around the country. As in 1992 with plants, FDA was forced to devise a 
method of regulating food and drugs produced by such animals, to determine which authorizing 
statutes to employ, and to decide whether to make its determinations binding or flexible. FDA 
has chosen to regulate GE animals in a manner that in one sense conforms with the 1992 Policy 
view that genetic engineering itself does not inherently render the food product unsafe, resulting 
in the use of an existing framework to regulate the product, and yet still laid out a much more 
rigorous, premarket approval process for food products from GE animals. 
A. 2009 Guidance on GE Animals 
1. Regulated Article: GE Animals Contain New Animal Drugs 
In 2008, FDA issued a proposed draft guidance on the regulation of GE animals. After 60 
days of comments from the industry, FDA issued a final guidance with essentially the same 
provisions, Guidance for Industry: Regulation of Genetically Engineered Animals Containing 
Heritable Recombinant DNA Constructs (“2009 Guidance”).
48 The hallmark of the 2009 
Guidance is that it asserted FDA’s authority over all GE animals (regardless of their ultimate 
use) through its FDCA authority over  “new animal drugs” (NADs).
49 §201(g) defines a “new 
                                                        
47 FDA Center for Veterinary Medicine, Guidance for Industry 187: Regulation of Genetically Engineered Animals 
Containing Heritable Recombinant DNA Constructs (Jan. 15, 2009), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AnimalVeterinary/GuidanceComplianceEnforcement/GuidanceforIndustry/UCM113
903.pdf [hereinafter 2009 Guidance]. 
48 Id. 
49 21 U.S.C.A. § 201; 2009 Guidance, supra note 47, at 4-5. 12 
animal drug” as any “article[] (other than food) intended to affect the structure or function of . . . 
animals.”
50 FDA determined that an rDNA construct is an animal drug because its insertion into 
the animal’s genome alters the animal’s structure or function, which therefore grants FDA 
authority over the resulting GE animal and its progency.
51 
  Under the statute, NADs are generally deemed unsafe unless FDA has approved a new 
animal drug application (NADA) for the particular use of the drug, except for the case of certain 
Investigational New Animal Drugs (INADs).
52 Because each transformation event is unique, i.e., 
because the rDNA cannot be precisely placed in a certain portion of the genome and thus likely 
ends up at a different site each time, a NADA would only cover the animal with the rDNA at a 
particular genomic locus. Yet because the guidance limited its purview to heritable rDNA 
constructs, each NADA will also cover all animals containing the same rDNA construct derived 
from the same transformation event, such as offspring descended from the original transgenic 
animal as a result of breeding.
53 
2. Enforcement Discretion  
  Although the 2009 Guidance asserted FDA’s authority to regulate all GE animals, it was 
clear that in most cases FDA would not intend to regulate (1) GE animals of non-food species 
regulated by other government agencies or entities, such as insects developed for pest control, 
and (2) GE laboratory animals of non-food species used for experimentation in research 
institutions.
54 Thus, similar to the 1992 Policy, FDA left itself a wide amount of leeway as to 
which products it would actually enforce. 
 
                                                        
50 2009 Guidance, supra note 47, at 4. 
51 Id.  
52 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 360(a)(1), 360(a)(3). 
53 2009 Guidance, supra note 47, at 6. 
54 Id. 13 
3. Labeling 
  Also similar to the 1992 Policy, the 2009 Guidance states that food derived from GE 
animals will not ordinarily need to be labeled, citing the same presumption that rDNA food is not 
different in a “material” way from its non-GE counterpart.
55 Similarly, it stated that if the 
nutritional profile of the GE food differed from its non-GE counterpart, this information would 
be required to be revealed in labeling.
56  
4. Environmental Review 
In compliance with NEPA, a NADA must either include a claim for a categorical 
exclusion or an EA.
57  “The EA is a public document that provides sufficient information to 
allow FDA to either prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) or issue a finding of no 
significant impact (FONSI).”
58 The 2009 Guidance also acknowledges the fact that the content of 
the EA will vary greatly with the organism and intended use of the GE product, and recommends 
that producers contact and work closely with FDA before the preparation of the EA.
59 The EA 
becomes public when the animal is approved.
60 The guidance also recognized that the EPA may 
also assert jurisdiction over certain GE animals, such as insects, and that FDA was discussing 
with it “the best approach for oversight.”
61 
5. Application 
The guidance lays out a detailed process for obtaining approval for a GE animal NAD. It 
notes that this is a “recommended process” on top of those required by existing NAD 
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regulations, which includes seven steps.
62 The Center for Veterinary Medicine (CVM) will then 
consider together the safety of the rDNA construct to the animal, the safety of the food produced 
by the animal, and the environmental impact, if any, of the animal. The guidance also describes 
the producer’s post-approval responsibilities for a NAD, already required under existing statutes 
and regulations,
63 including registration and drug listing, recordkeeping, filing supplements, and 
periodic reporting.
64  In terms of publicity, it stated that “at present” FDA intends to hold public 
Veterinary Medicine Advisory Committee (VMAC) meetings prior to approving any GE animal, 
but that it “may revisit that policy in the future.”
65 
5. Conclusions 
  The 2009 Guidance is similar to the 1992 Policy in that FDA chose to regulate GE foods 
through non-binding recommendations that leave many determinations to agency discretion, 
rather than through notice-and-comment rulemaking. It also reached the same determination not 
to label GE food as such. However, FDA clearly recognized the increased potential for danger 
from food from GE animals by describing a much more stringent mechanism to regulate their 
products long before they ever reach the shelves (by using the regulatory scheme for NADs), in 
stark contrast to the lax standard for products from GE plants that investigates whether or not the 
food produced is adulterated. 
B. Comments and Criticism of the 2009 Guidance 
  Like its counterpart almost two decades prior, the 2009 Guidance was not without its 
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critics. The most thorough comments to the proposed draft, submitted by the Consumers Union 
(“CU Comments”), contained four main criticisms of the guidance.
66  
The first concern is that the guidance is not legally binding, and so producers are 
theoretically free to deviate from it as they see fit. Second is the lack of transparency in the 
NADA process.
67 Under the 2009 Guidance, almost all of the application process can take place 
without notification to the public until the GE animal is approved.
68 The CU Comments argue 
that “in general, safety and health data should not be considered confidential business 
information.”
69 They note that although FDA intends to hold public VMAC meetings for the first 
few GE animals, FDA could easily decide not to hold these meetings after the first few 
approvals.
70 The third concern is the risk of an incomplete environmental review – that FDA is 
not the best qualified agency to conduct a comprehensive environmental safety assessment for 
the animal, and that such assessments should be done instead by the EPA.
71 
  Fourth, the CU comments argue that GE foods should be required to be labeled as such, 
because their difference from non-GE foods is a “material difference”, and is against strong 
consumer interest. First, CU argues that FDA’s guidance is inconsistent with the FDCA by 
rendering the labeling of the food “misleading”, by failing to disclose the rDNA construct as an 
“ingredient” in the food.
72 Second, it argues that strong consumer interest renders the difference 
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between GE food and non-GE food “material.”
73 It cites a 2008 survey that 95% of consumers 
agreed that “food products made from genetically engineered animals should be labeled as 
such.”
74 It also cites an FDA final rule on irradiated food, which required labeling even after a 
determination that the foods were safe, because widespread consumer interest was a factor 
indicative of the materiality of irradiation.
75 Similarly, it notes that FDA has required labeling for 
protein hydrolysates because of materiality based solely on religious concerns of consumers.
76 It 
also argues that labeling should be required in order to enable tracking of adverse health effects 
of consumption of GE animals.
77  
  Finally, the CU Comments criticize the scientific rigor FDA would apply in its NADA 
evaluations. For example, they note that while FDA guidance requires molecular characterization 
“of the article”, the molecular characterization should be much more thorough, including “total 
number of inserts of transgenic DNA . . . exact chromosomal position of each insert . . .  
complete (nucleotide) base sequence of each insert; nucleotide base sequence of at least 10kbp of 
flanking host genome DNA on either side of the insert, including changes in methylation 
patterns.”
78 In other words, the exact DNA sequences on either end of where the rDNA construct 
is inserted should be required to be identified so that scientists can better predict how the rDNA 
will interact with (or potentially interrupt) the genes around it.
79 It also recommended that FDA 
require stricter assurances of the rDNA’s stability,
80 citing studies demonstrating that rDNA 
genes in various GE crops were much less stable than previously thought, resulting in 
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abnormalities such as rearranged inserts, partial copies of genes inserted, multiple copies of 
transgenes inserted, and scrambling of DNA near the border of the transgenic inserts.
81 The CU 
also highlighted various other ways in which a NADA should involve a more thorough scientific 
investigation.
82  
Although many of these challenges mimicked those that were brought against the 1992 
Policy for plants in Bio-Integrity Alliance (and that failed), they are important to note because 
they highlight potentially troublesome features of the 2009 Guidance (both as a matter of law 
and as a matter of policy), against which FDA’s consideration of recent GE animals can be 
evaluated. Thus far, there have been three examples of GE animals on which FDA has already 
made significant decisions: a GE animal used as a pet (the GloFish), a GE animal used as a drug 
(the ATryn goat), and a GE animal used as food (the AquAdvantage salmon). 
III. THE GE ANIMAL FRAMEWORK APPLIED: THREE CASE STUDIES 
A. GE Animal as Pet: the GloFish 
  Yorktown Technologies genetically engineered a zebra fish to glow in the dark by using 
an rDNA construct from a sea coral, which it wished to market as an ornamental or pet fish. In 
2003, Yorktown sought FDA’s views regarding the fish, trademark named the GloFish™.
83 
After reviewing the materials submitted by Yorktown and consulting with the Animal and Plant 
Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of the Department of Agriculture (USDA), FDA issued the 
following statement: 
Because tropical aquarium fish are not used for food purposes, they pose no threat to the 
food supply. There is no evidence that these genetically engineered zebra danio fish pose 
any more threat to the environment than their unmodified counterparts which have long 
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been widely sold in the United States. In the absence of a clear risk to the public health, 
FDA finds no reason to regulate these particular fish.
84 
 
The fish was made commercially available immediately thereafter.
85  No other agency, including 
the EPA and USDA, attempted to regulate the GloFish.
86 
This (in)action was challenged in federal district court in Int’l Ctr. For Tech. Assessment 
v. Thompson, when plaintiffs alleged that FDA’s decision not to require Yorktown to follow 
NAD procedures was arbitrary and capricious, and failed to satisfy FDA’s NEPA obligations.
87 
The court dismissed both arguments, first holding that FDA’s decision not to regulate the 
GloFish lay within the agency’s enforcement discretion and thus beyond judicial review.
88 
Second, it held that FDA did not violate NEPA by failing to prepare an EIS because its decision 
was not a “major federal action.” It reasoned, “NEPA applies only to agency actions ‘even if 
inaction has environmental consequences’.”
89 Because the decision not to regulate was merely 
agency “inaction”, NEPA’s requirements were not triggered.
90 
At least one commentator has argued that Thompson was wrongly decided. The argument 
first contends that under the FDCA, FDA is mandated to review a NADA or else an animal drug 
“shall be deemed unsafe” and therefore “adulterated”, and adulterated drugs are prohibited from 
delivery or introduction into interstate commerce.
91 Thus, it is illegal for FDA to allow GloFish 
to be sold without conducting a NAD assessment. Second, it argues that the refusal to regulate 
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the GloFish was in fact a major federal action, citing Found. on Econ. Funds v. Heckler, in 
which the D.C. Circuit enjoined the NIH from approving the release of a GE bacterium into the 
environment without first conducting an EIS and reasoned “NEPA would be toothless if agencies 
could merely issue a conclusory statement that the action did not significantly affect the 
environment (and that therefore no EIS was required)”.
92 Finally, the commentator argued that 
FDA’s decision was improper as a matter of policy: “With its GloFish decision, FDA ripped a 
large hole in the regulatory net--a hole through which all transgenic ornamental fish, and quite 
possibly all pets, may escape.”
93   
A few lessons emerge from the GloFish example. For one, while FDA asserts its authority 
over all NADs, it seems only concerned about regulating GE animals when they constitute food 
or drugs – even if the animals are sold to the public in some fashion. It shows that FDA still 
considers GE animals to be presumptively safe, by failing to conduct any safety assessment into 
the animal just because it had been genetically engineered. It also demonstrates that in some 
cases, environmental assessments of GE animals released to the public are not being conducted 
by any agency whatsoever. Finally, Thompson suggests that as in Alliance for Bio-Integrity, FDA 
will be largely protected from judicial review of its (in)actions with regards to GE animals, but 
by a new, additional shield, enforcement discretion.
94  
B. GE Animal as Drug: the ATryn Goat 
  GTC Biotherapeutics developed a goat genetically engineered to produce the human 
protein antithrombin in its milk.  Antithrombin is an important blood coagulant, of which a small 
subset of the human population is deficient in due to a hereditary disorder; the biologic produced 
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by the goat is recombinant human antithrombin III, called ATryn.
95 In February 2009, FDA 
approved both the NADA for the GE animal through the CVM, as well as the safety and efficacy 
of the biologic for human use through the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research 
(CBER).
96 Although there was no opportunity for the public to comment on the GE animal 
before it was approved, FDA conducted an EA on the use of the rDNA construct in the goat,
97 
which it published along with the NADA after approval.
98  
The EA entails a thorough review into the safety and stability of the rDNA construct over 
seven generations of goats,
99 a well as into the efforts made to contain the GE goats from 
escaping. The goats are housed in two facilities in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, and all are 
penned by two levels of physical containment, and are identified by ear tattoos, neck tags, and 
electronic transponders that allow them to be easily tracked if they somehow escape.
100 The EA 
noted that the lack of known feral goat populations in Pennsylvania or Massachusetts made any 
breeding before location of the GE goat extremely unlikely.
101 Precautions are also taken to 
make sure that their bodily products are incapable of entering the food supply.
102 After reviewing 
GTC’s EA, FDA concluded that “the action will not have a significant effect on the quality of the 
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101 Id. at 20. 
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human environment”, leading to a finding of no significant impact (FONSI).
103 Because FDA 
reached a FONSI, it was thus not required to prepare an EIS under NEPA.
104 
The ATryn goat example demonstrates that while FDA does not seem to have an interest 
in regulating GE animals used for pets, in stark contrast it seems to require in practice a thorough 
regulation of GE animals used for drugs (apart from the evaluation of the drug itself), in line with 
the 2009 Guidance. It suggests that in complying with NEPA, FDA would prefer to have the 
producers satisfy FDA of its environmental safety to allow a FONSI, rather than require FDA to 
submit an EIS. Also, the ATryn case demonstrates that although the 2009 Guidance initially 
envisioned a public hearing before the approval of each GE animal, such publicity equally could 
not occur if FDA does not desire it, as it was absent in this case. Similarly, while it evidenced 
that the CVM was conducting an extremely thorough review into the safety of the rDNA 
construct to the animal and to humans, it might not publish the findings on which those 
conclusions depended (e.g. characterization of the insertion site, etc., comparisons of goat 
phenotypes, etc.). 
  Finally, the ATryn goat raises an ethical issue of inserting a human gene into an animal, 
creating in some sense a human-animal hybrid. While the issue did not draw much public 
criticism, FDA has still stated that such ethical issues are beyond its jurisdiction.
105 However, 
this type of genetic manipulation might be greatly disconcerting to some, and the lack of public 
notification prior to approval exacerbates this concern. 
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C. GE Animal as Food: the AquAdvantage Salmon 
  Currently before FDA is the “elephant in the room”: a salmon that would be the first GE 
animal to be marketed as human food, which is close to approval.
106 Aqua Bounty has 
genetically engineered Atlantic salmon with a gene from Chinook salmon that allows it to grow 
twice as fast as its normal Atlantic salmon. The gene makes the fish produce growth hormone 
year round instead of only seasonally. The resulting AquAdvantage® salmon (AAS) do not 
ultimately grow any larger than their non-GE counterparts, but just reach adult size faster.  
1. Pending NADA Approval 
  In September 2010, after a public notice, VMAC held public hearings on the NADA 
approval of the fish as food and whether FDA should require it to be labeled. It has made the 
NADA itself public, as well as Aqua Bounty’s EA. Although to date FDA has not yet approved 
the NADA, according to Larisa Rudenko, a senior official at CVM, the fact that there has been a 
VMAC meeting is a “really good sign that we’re approaching completion.”
107 FDA compiled the 
data from Aqua Bounty’s NADA, evaluated it, and gave its evaluation and recommendations to 
VMAC in a 180-page Briefing Packet. The Briefing Packet indicated that the rDNA construct 
was stable over seven generations,
108 there were no significant differences found between the 
food produced by AAS and non-GE salmon,
109 and there were not  any “biologically significant” 
health differences between AAS and non-GE salmon.
110 Importantly, the Briefing Packet listed 
in great detail all of the relevant studies that had been conducted on AAS salmon by Aqua 
Bounty and others, allowing public access to the same data FDA has in making its determination. 
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As for environmental impact, FDA indicated that it expected to issue a FONSI because  
Aqua Bounty was found to have taken adequate measures to prevent the escape of AAS or its 
genes into the wild.
111 Under the current plan, AAS eggs will be produced in Prince Edward 
Island, Canada. The eggs will then be shipped to a facility in the highlands of Panama, where 
they will be grown and processed, and then the processed fish will be returned to the United 
States.
112 Both facilities are land-based, and involve multiple physical forms of containment, 
such as screens, nets, and fences. Additionally, it is believed that the conditions of the water 
around the facility in Panama are generally extremely unfavorable for any escaped AAS salmon 
to survive.
113 Furthermore, the fish are designed so that if they were to escape, reproduction 
would be extremely unlikely: all AAS are designed to be females and triploid, meaning they 
have three sets of chromosomes and are thus rendered sterile.
114 FDA concluded that these 
“multiple and redundant” barriers to AAS escaping or reproducing led to the inclination of 
FONSI.
115  
Finally, because of the uncertainty of some of the science and the desire to ensure the 
rDNA construct remains stable and safe, the report detailed a plan for post-approval safety 
surveillance of the fish and facilities.
116 Such surveillance will include monitoring of randomly 
selected AAS fish for morphologic irregularities, rDNA construct stability, and triploidy.
117 The 
report concluded that such measures were acceptable to address FDA’s minor concerns about the 
phenotypic characterization of the fish.
118  
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2. Labeling 
Immediately after the public hearing on the safety of AAS salmon, FDA held a public 
hearing just to address the issue of labeling, hosted by the Center for Food Safety and Applied 
Nutrition (CFSAN).
119 Prior to the hearing, FDA issued to the public a “Background Document” 
on the principles of labeling, reiterating the position of the 2009 Guidance that the differences 
between AAS and non-GE salmon would only be “material” if they “differ materially in 
nutritional value, organoleptic properties, or functional characteristics”.
120  Moreover, because 
the AAS Briefing Packet stated the conclusion that “there are no material differences in food 
from ABT [AAS] salmon and other Atlantic salmon”,
121 it seems almost certain that FDA’s 
ultimate determination will be not to require labeling of AAS salmon regardless of the hearing. 
2. Comments and Criticism 
  Given the opportunity for public comment and criticism of the AAS fish, Consumers 
Union submitted another scathing comment. First, it complained that the public was only given 
14 days to review the materials before the public hearing, which was not enough to conduct a 
thorough review of all the information, and asked that the period be extended to 60-90 days.
122  
That request was not granted. Second, it contested that the VMAC was not comprised of 
sufficiently experienced experts, because it “lacks any scientists whose primary expertise is in 
food allergies, endocrinology or fish ecology, the main topics on which the VMAC will have to 
render judgments in order to conclude that the salmon is safe.”
123  
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Its next criticisms charged that the data comprised in the NADA were insufficient to 
allow FDA to reach a conclusion of the safety of AAS to humans, animals, and the environment, 
and was scientifically unsound.
124  It noted that the sample size of the allergenicity study was too 
small at only six fish; that Aqua Bounty manipulated the IGF-1 (a potentially dangerous 
hormone) data by dropping unfavorable data points; that it was improper for FDA to conclude 
that there were “insignificant differences” between growth hormone levels in the flesh of AAS 
and non-GE fish, because in reality it had no data at all on those hormone levels due to 
insensitive test methodology; and that none of the phenotypic data were scientifically reliable 
because the tests were conducted on fish raised at the Prince Edward Island Facility and not in 
Panama where all the marketed fish will be raised, and FDA itself even admitted there are 
significant differences in the conditions at the two facilities that would affect the phenotype of 
the fish.
125  
  These comments appear to launch a serious assault on the legitimacy of the underlying 
science that led FDA to its preliminary conclusions. Its characterization of the VMAC as not 
sufficiently experienced is also disconcerting. Perhaps the fact that FDA has delayed 
significantly since its September hearing to approve AAS salmon demonstrates a lack of 
confidence in those initial findings presented to VMAC.  
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Congress has also taken efforts to block both FDA’s approval of AAS and its putative 
intent not to label. In January 2011, bills were introduced in both the House and Senate, one to 
prohibit the approval of food from all GE fish entirely and the other to require the labeling of the 
GE fish.
126 Currently, both bills are at the committee stage. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Conclusions 
  The three case studies provide prime examples for evaluating FDA’s 2009 Guidance. In 
short, the cases demonstrate that the policy of the 2009 Guidance, to use the new animal drug 
framework to govern GE animals and their products, is awkward and problematic. For one, 
FDA’s interpretation has resulted in an overbroad assertion of authority by FDA over animals it 
clearly has no intent of regulating. According to FDA’s Mission, it must “protect the public 
health by ensuring that -- foods are safe, wholesome, sanitary, and properly labeled; human and 
veterinary drugs are safe and effective; there is reasonable assurance of the safety and 
effectiveness of devices intended for human use; cosmetics are safe and properly labeled; and 
public health and safety are protected from electronic product radiation”.
127 Given this mission, it 
is not surprising or troubling that FDA has chosen not to regulate all GE lab animals, given the 
lack of implication of the public welfare and enormous variety of experiments at research 
institutions, which are already checked by other internal mechanisms such as Institutional 
Review Boards. Nor is it troubling in itself that FDA is not regulating GE animals used as pets – 
again, they are seemingly beyond its purview.  
1. The current policy does not adequately consider environmental risks of GE animals. 
What is troubling about the GloFish example, however, is that it demonstrates how the  
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2009 Guidance, combined with the inaction of other agencies, gives short shrift to environmental 
risks of GE animals. Per the GloFish, nobody is regulating GE pets (except the industry itself), 
leaving their potential for environmental damage untested. The EPA is probably the best agency 
for this, however, and at least one commentator has argued that the EPA has statutory authority 
to regulate GE pets under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA).
128 Moreover, it is not clear 
why FDA should need to conduct no environmental assessment for a transgenic fish people do 
not eat, yet need to conduct a painfully exacting environmental assessment for a transgenic fish 
people do eat, including multiple redundant genetic and physical barriers to escape. This is just 
one of the consequences of FDA “trying to force a square peg into a round hole” in its 2009 
Guidance.
129  
Perhaps this problem demonstrates the inadequacy of the NEPA system to cope with GE 
organisms. The system requiring agencies to conduct their own EAs is more appropriate when an 
agency action is more akin to the release of a single chemical or toxin; GE is unique and 
different because the “substance” that could be released in the environment is itself capable of 
reproducing and altering an entire ecosystem through evolutionary biology (recall the “Trojan 
gene” example)
130– an event that would have major environmental implications.
131 Agencies 
other than the EPA may lack the complex ecological knowledge needed to evaluate the 
potentially enormous ramifications of a single escape of a GE animal. To bolster this concern, 
thus far FDA has expressed a strong preference for FONSIs over EISs, demonstrating that FDA 
may wish to keep environmental assessments out of the hands of EPA.  
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2. The current policy gives FDA too much discretion in determining which GE articles it will 
and will not regulate, leaving some articles potentially unregulated. 
As a preliminary matter, that FDA has asserted its discretionary authority over broad 
categories of animals it apparently has no interest in regulating itself should be undesirable under 
principles of good governance. Second, the failure of the Thompson challenge to FDA’s refusal 
to regulate the GloFish demonstrates that the elaborate mechanisms of the 2009 Guidance are 
purely optional on the part of FDA. Moreover, at least in Thompson this discretion did not appear 
to be limited in any way. That is, while it is not disconcerting that FDA does not have to regulate 
a pet if it does not want to in its “enforcement discretion,” it is disconcerting that FDA by the 
same reasoning does not have to regulate a food or drug produced by a GE animal if it does not 
wish to, and similarly could avoid any assessment of the animal’s environmental impact. This 
discretion itself may not be problematic if one trusts FDA to accurately weigh the risks against 
the benefits of GE animals. However, in the current situation, where FDA’s 25 year-old policy of 
substantial equivalence appears out of touch with the modern scientific knowledge of GE 
organisms, one has far less faith in the agency’s discretion.  
3. The current policy allows FDA to conduct inadequate inquiries into the safety of GE animals; 
this is exacerbated by lack of public participation. 
Similarly, that the guidance envisions public hearings for the first few GE animals it 
approves is commendable; yet it is worrisome that this was not done for the very first FDA-
approved GE animal, the ATryn goat.  Moreover, the gravity of the criticisms in the comments to 
the AquAdvantage fish, demonstrating fundamentally flawed scientific assumptions on which a 
conclusion of safety to humans and the animal was drawn, highlight the importance of public 29 
input in this process. Once more, the non-mandatory nature of the 2009 Guidance, while 
allowing FDA maximum flexibility, does not ensure much confidence in the public. 
Having GE animals regulated as animal drugs also produces a mismatch in the way the 
safety evidence before FDA is evaluated, with the Center for Veterinary Medicine conducting the 
primary inquiry into issues such as the safety of a food for human consumption. Although one 
could argue that FDA is competent enough to correct for this mismatch by placing proper experts 
on the VMAC, there are at least concerns that in the AquAdvantage case, FDA did no such thing. 
Finally, the current scheme leaves out any inquiry into the ethical issues raised by GE 
animals. Under the current regulatory scheme, if FDA is not looking into such concerns, no one 
is, and because FDA has stated the concerns are beyond its jurisdiction, literally no one at all is. 
B. Remedies and Recommendations 
  The dysfunction of the entire regulatory approach to GE organisms – assuming that GE 
organisms are substantially equivalent to non-GE organisms, and as such can be regulated just as 
well through existing regulatory and statutory structures – has become apparent through the 
recent plant and animal literature and cases. The assumption of the 1986 Comprehensive Plan, 
that the product should be regulated instead of the process, is simply outdated and unworkable. 
1. Congress should act to institute a comprehensive statutory scheme to govern GE animals. 
   What is most needed is for Congress to overhaul the system and institute a 
comprehensive scheme for the regulation of GE organisms (although this paper only focuses on 
GE animals). FDA should remain in its area of expertise and evaluate the safety to humans of all 
food and drugs produced by GE animals, which would involve a thorough investigation into 
differences between the living GE animals and their non-GE counterparts (safety to the animal), 
as well as into the differences between their meat if consumed (safety to humans). FDA should 30 
be mandated to conduct a more exacting inquiry into food safety with a premarket approval 
system more akin to the standard for non-GRAS food additives than for ordinary unadulterated 
foods. The EPA should remain in its area of expertise and conduct environmental assessments 
for all GE animals that are expected to be accessed by the public in any way, whether alive or 
through food or drugs, regardless of their ultimate human use. As it currently does, the USDA 
should continue to oversee the slaughtering and shipping of the animal meat. Congress should 
give explicit authorization to FDA to regulate such GE animals so that it would not have to use 
the awkward NAD framework, and to the EPA so that its jurisdiction would be clear. 
  Moreover, Congress must institute a mechanism to consider ethical issues raised by GE 
animals that FDA has asserted are beyond its jurisdiction – the ethical limits as to what kind of 
and how many human genes may be inserted into a GE animal, as to what kind of deviations 
from an animal’s “normal” anatomy and behavior induced by genetic engineering are acceptable, 
etc. In the same vein, Congress should mandate the labeling of all food derived from GE animals 
as such, recognizing that such a difference is “material” in any real sense of the word, given the 
overwhelming consumer interest for personal autonomy and religious reasons, and inherent 
uncertainty of science of its safety at this point. 
2. Litigation challenging the legality of FDA approvals of non-enforcement of GE animals is 
unlikely to succeed, but could have value.  
  Although challenges could be raised to FDA’s 2009 Guidance and individual decisions, 
as in Alliance for Bio-Integrity and Thompson, they are likely to fail. However, it is possible that 
a court could see things differently five years after Thompson, now that the agency has issued its 
final guidance, and find that an agency action (or inaction) did rise to the level of being arbitrary 
and capricious. For example, if FDA were to fail to regulate a much more threatening pet than 31 
the GloFish, and such a challenge were brought, a court might find the inaction to constitute 
“major agency action” under the meaning of NEPA. Although the commentator who argued that 
Thompson was decided wrongly, citing Heckler, took this position, she did not acknowledge that 
Heckler was distinguishable. In that case there was an actual NIH action that was enjoined, 
approval of the release of the bacterium, rather than inaction, as the court found in Thompson. 
However, one could argue that the line between agency action and inaction is purely semantic; 
i.e., whether there is any relevant difference between FDA approving a NAD for a new GE pet 
(or any other GE animal for that matter), and merely standing by as the unapproved GE pet went 
on the market unpunished and unregulated. Once more, given the nature of GE animals, which 
are capable of reproducing by themselves once released, the environmental consequence of a 
release could be truly major. Thus, perhaps courts would be willing to take a tougher stance than 
before to make sure that FDA complies with NEPA in its regulation of GE animals.  
Additionally, perhaps serious concerns to the scientific rigor of FDA’s determination of 
safety in a NAD (from manipulation of data, etc.) could in fact rise to the level of finding a NAD 
approval arbitrary and capricious as well. 
3. Internal regulatory change is also unlikely to occur, but is the simplest mechanism for rapid 
change. 
  Finally, one could hope that FDA will reevaluate its 2009 Guidance. For example, it 
could promulgate binding regulations interpreting its statutory authority as limited to GE animals 
used for food and drugs (still using NAD provisions to assert jurisdiction) and then merely 
mandate a stricter scheme more in touch with the ultimate use of the animal.  This seems to be a 
plausible interpretation of the NAD statute. It could mandate NADs, EAs, and public hearings 
(with a sufficient period for the public to review the underlying data) for all GE animals intended 32 
to be used as food or drugs, and change its course on labeling. Allowing the entire process to go 
through notice and comment would also ensure vigorous public debate over these issues, which 
has sadly been lacking up to this point. The fact that FDA is conducting public hearings to debate 
the labeling of AquAdvantage salmon, where such labeling would clearly seem not to be 
required under the 2009 Guidance, suggests that FDA’s opinions may indeed be flexible. All GE 
animals that are not used for food or drugs, yet expected to be released or sold publicly such as 
pets, could potentially be evaluated by the EPA asserting its jurisdiction under TSCA.
132 
  In sum, for law to work effectively and well, it must be in touch with science. The 
scientific evidence that GE animals designed through rDNA techniques carry risks that are 
fundamentally different from those FDA has previously encountered is extremely strong. In 
tandem with other regulatory agencies, FDA must try its best to keep up with the science, and 
ensure that the enthusiasm over the enormous benefits of GE organisms is tempered by a 
thorough examination into the potential dangers of each individual one. Because of the potential 
magnitude of harm, such thorough examinations should be codified rather than left to the agency 
to hide behind the shields of Chevron deference, non-binding statements of policy, and 
enforcement discretion such that its decisions are judicially unreviewable. As GE animals 
continue to make their way into American homes, one hopes that the current holes in the 
regulatory net are not large enough for too dangerous a fish to swim through – or whatever 
creature will follow in its wake. 
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